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Abstract  
 Communism is the ideology which aims at exterminating all religions 
as, it is believed, they are harmful to social life. Therefore, after the 2nd World 
War, under the arrangements between the allies, communists took control in 
Poland and started to gradually but systematically eliminate the influence of 
the Church and the Catholic religion on the society. Due to the confrontational 
attitude of the ruling party towards the Church, the relations between the 
Polish Episcopate and the communist authorities were dominated by the 
permanent, mainly ideological, conflicts. The breakthrough happened as late 
as in the 80s of 20th century. At that time, not only did the relations between 
the former enemies improve but they both started to work together towards the 
normalization and humanization of the relations between the communist 
regime and the Episcopate. The result was the participation of the 
representatives of the Episcopate in the behind-closed-doors negotiations in 
Magdalenka which happened before the deal between the government and a 
part of the Solidarity opposition was signed at “the round table”. 
The main aim of this publication is to present the role of the Episcopate in the 
process of the political changes in Poland. In the 80s, the Episcopate 
constituted a specific and unique social group which brought together 
hierarchs who had various attitudes towards the communist authorities. What 
caused the internal tensions and divisions within the Episcopate were the 
Church representatives making deals with the former oppressors as well as 
various attitudes of bishops towards the ruling party. On the basis of the 
secondary sources, the author of the publication will attempt to present the role 
of the Episcope in the moderation of the agreements which became the 
backbone of the political changes in Poland, i.e. the transformation of 
communism into post-communism. 
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Introduction 
 Communism is the ideology which aims at exterminating all religions 
as, it is believed, they are harmful to social life. Therefore, after the 2nd World 
War, under the arrangements between the allies, communists took control in 
Poland and started to gradually but systematically eliminate the influence of 
the Church and the Catholic religion on the society. Due to the confrontational 
attitude of the ruling party towards the Church, the relations between the 
Polish Episcopate and the communist authorities were dominated by the 
permanent, mainly ideological, conflicts. The breakthrough happened as late 
as in the 80s of 20th century. At that time, not only did the relations between 
the former enemies improve but they both started to work together towards the 
normalization and humanization of the relations between the communist 
regime and the Episcopate. The result was the participation of the 
representatives of the Episcopate in the behind-closed-doors negotiations in 
Magdalenka which happened before the deal between the government and a 
part of the Solidarity opposition was signed at “the round table”. 
 The main aim of this publication is to present the role of the Episcopate 
in the process of the political changes in Poland. In the 80s, the Episcopate 
constituted a specific and unique social group which brought together 
hierarchs who had various attitudes towards the communist authorities. What 
caused the internal tensions and divisions within the Episcopate were the 
Church representatives making deals with the former oppressors as well as 
various attitudes of bishops towards the ruling party. On the basis of the 
secondary sources, the author of the publication will attempt to present the role 
of the Episcope in the moderation of the agreements which became the 
backbone of the political changes in Poland, i.e. the transformation of 
communism into post-communism.  
 
Towards the normalization and humanization of the relations between 
the government and the Episcopate 
 The most radical transformations in all forms of social life in the Polish 
People’s Republic happened in the 80s. They were mainly caused by the 
economic breakdown and the moral degradation of the communist authorities. 
The Polish society decisively rejected the statist model of socialism and chose 
the path of democratic reforms (Marczuk, 1993, 5-6). What also underwent 
the transformation were the relations between the Episcopate and the 
communist regime. An important factor which influenced the change in the 
attitude of the Episcopate towards the ruling party was, undeniably, the death 
of the leader of the Conference of the Polish Episcopate, the Primate cardinal 
Stefan Wyszynski (28th May 1981) and the nomination of his successor, the 
bishop Jozef Glemp (7th July 1981). The Primate Wyszynski was the head of 
the Polish Episcopate in the most difficult period for the Catholic Church in 
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the Polish People’s Republic. He was well aware of the methods of operation 
of the communist regime and he personally experienced the repression which 
aimed at eradicating the Catholic Church in Poland, especially during the 
Stalin’s terror. Therefore, he always approached the representatives of the 
ruling party with reservation. When the communist regime towards the Church 
relaxed, he knew that this didn’t result from the sudden change of the attitude 
of the authorities towards the Church, but from the weaker position of the 
communist authorities in the society. That way they were trying to gain real 
advantages. The cardinal Stefan Wyszynski was also very careful when it 
came to the relations with the representatives of the Solidarity opposition. He 
fully supported the ideals of the ”Solidarity” union which, by defending 
working class and by aiming at the democratization of social life in Poland, 
drew inspiration from the social education of the Church. Wyszynski was also 
convinced that the Polish society needed the “Solidarity” union as it had an 
important role to perform. Therefore, he supported its valuable initiatives. 
However, he was also aware of the great diversity which existed within the 
union as its members represented different ideological groups. The Primate 
knew that the main activists associated with Lech Walesa, i.e. Bronislaw 
Geremek, Jacek Kuron, Adam Michnik i Karol Modzelewski had the same 
ideological origin. In the most difficult period of the Stalin’s terror, Geremek 
was the first secretary of the Basic Party Organization of the Polish United 
Workers’ Party in the Institute of History of the Polish Academy of Sciences. 
Jacek Kuron founded the red scouting association, making a reference to the 
symbolism and ideology of the Russian Komsomol. Karol Modzelewski and 
Adam Michnik, who had been brought up in the families of the communist 
activists, were ideologically close to the fraction of Trotskyism which existed 
inside the communist movement (Kiezun, 2012, 83; W cieniu prymasa..., 
2001, 139; Raina, 2005, 91-94). The primate Wyszynski avoided contacts with 
the former communist activists and his reservation towards some of the 
activists of the Solidarity opposition mainly depended on their communist 
past.  
 It seems that the new Primate, Jozef Glemp, did not adopt the firm 
standpoint of his predecessor towards the communist regime. He undertook 
various initiatives and sent clear signals which confirmed his conciliatory and 
open attitude towards the party elite. Also, the team of the general Wojciech 
Jaruzelski attempted to create the positive image of the Primate. This can be 
confirmed e.g. by the opinion of the manager of the Denomination Office, 
Adam Lopatka, expressed in December 1982 at the meeting of the lectors of 
the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party: The Primate […] 
has a positive attitude and the right political line as well as the ability to 
pursue it. […] He aims at ensuring the presence of the Church in the socialist 
Poland and at rejecting the idea of overthrowing the Socialist regime. In this 
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respect, the Primate is very strong-minded and, clearly, he has the ability to 
achieve it. Therefore, I think that we should not support any opinions 
commonly spread by the hostile national and international organizations in 
order to discredit him. Of course, we cannot expect the Primate to act as if he 
was the member of the Political Bureau, the secretary of the Central 
Committee or the minister of the Polish People’s Republic. We need to 
remember that there is a certain ecclesiastical way of disclosing his attitude 
and the political line. We need to have it in mind when considering the political 
image of the Primate (Wystapienie kierownika Urzedu..., 1996, 372). At the 
same time, the Primate Glemp did not have a clear standpoint towards the 
proscribed “Solidarity”. The historian, Jan Zaryn, is convinced that, similarly 
to the majority of the Polish Episcopate, the cardinal Jozef Glemp didn’t 
dogmatically equate the well-being of the nation with an absolute necessity to 
reactivate <Solidarity>  (Zaryn, 2009, 48). It seems that the Primate’s 
readiness to cooperate with the authorities, with the simultaneous defensive 
attitude towards the proscribed “Solidarity”, clearly indicated the shift in the 
policy of the Episcopate leaders.   
 Favourable conditions for the implementation of the policy of the 
cardinal Glemp influenced the attitudes of the majority of the members of the 
Episcopate towards communists. The analysis of the secret document prepared 
by the officers of the 4th Department of the Ministry of the Interior in March 
1988, “The almanac of the bishops of the Catholic Church in Poland”31, shows 
that the majority of the members of the Episcopate (58 bishops) had a neutral 
(moderate) attitude towards the authorities. One in four hierarchs (25) was 
perceived as the opponent of the ruling party and socialism and nearly one in 
seven hierarchs (15) had a positive attitude towards the authorities. Bishops 
with a neutral or positive attitude towards the authorities constituted nearly 
two thirds of the Episcopate (73 out of 98). (The Ministry of the Interior, 1988, 
33-212; Jedynak, 2016, 247). 
 The distribution of the political preferences among the Episcopate 
members (estimated by the Security Service) turned out to be favourable for 
the policy of dialogue and for the former opponents to come closer to each 
other. The sociologist Jadwiga Staniszkis thinks that closer relations between 
the representatives of the Episcopate and the communist authorities, observed 
from the beginning of the 80s, influenced the attitude of “Solidarity” towards 
the Church hierarchy. In her opinion, these changes led to the reduction of the 
                                                          
31 The typescript with the reference number of Ug-0818/88, prepared by the 4th Department 
of the Ministry of the Interior in March 1988, holds a security classification. The document is 
230 page long and, marked with the number 033, it includes the information about the attitude 
of all Polish bishops towards the communist authorities. The number 003 means that it was 
made available for the narrow circle of the supreme officers of the Security Service and the 
representatives of the communist regime. 
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influence of the Church on the union activists, especially on the regional level. 
According to Staniszkis, the transformation of the relations between the 
hierarchs and the ruling party generated a permanent tendency towards 
secularization among the “Solidarity” activists. (Staniszkis, 2010, 114-115). 
 In the 80s, the attitude of the Episcopate towards the government was, 
to a great extent, moderated by the communist authorities themselves which, 
in various ways, tried to influence the attitudes and the behaviour of the 
Church hierarchs. It is evident from the government documents that the 
representatives of the ruling party wanted the Episcopate to have a stake in 
supporting the party elite. They made compromises with the aim to 
permanently detach the Church structures from the political opposition, to 
gain the Church support for the political line of Jaruzelski (even limited and 
critical) and to gain the confidence that, in the situation of crisis, the Church 
will be their safety valve (Dudek, 2004, 88-89). Moreover, the communists 
wanted the Episcopate to associate its interests with the present authorities 
and the ruling party (Dudek, 2004, 89). The general Wojciech Jaruzelski 
thought that in the relations between the authorities and the Episcopate the 
<carrot and stick> method should be consequently followed. The Church 
needs to consider what will pay off and what will not (Dudek, 2004, 80). 
Evaluating the attitude of the Episcopate towards the communist authorities 
Antoni Dudek comes to the conclusion that, in the 80s, the Church hierarchy 
played a twofold game. It is evident from the documents of the Ministry of the 
Interior (1987): At the moment the Church has an ambivalent attitude. On one 
hand, in order not to lose the social support, it openly criticizes the authorities. 
On the other hand, it is not interested in the further aggravation of the 
situation in Poland. It is aware of the fact that every next political turn will 
result in the loss of their strong position as the political partner to the 
authorities (Dudek, 2004, 80).     
 
Moderating the arrangements between the communists and the 
opposition 
 A clear shift in the relations between the Episcopate and the ruling 
party occurred in 1987. The communist authorities made conciliatory gestures 
towards their opponent and they tried to avoid any behaviour that could be 
taken as the comeback to the hostile rhetoric. Also, the Episcopate undertook 
the conciliatory activities. The interview with the Primate Glemp for the 
Moscow newspaper “Literaturnaja Gazieta” was rather sensational as it was 
perceived as a new beginning in the relations between the Episcopate 
representatives and the communist regime (The interview with the Primate 
cardinal..., 1996, 537-542). During the preparation of the third visit of John 
Paul II to Poland both sides took the diplomatic efforts aimed at improving the 
relations between the authorities and the Church. The efforts taken by the 
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Episcopate were supported by the representatives of the Vatican diplomacy 
who were also in touch with the supreme communist authorities. It seems that 
the shift in the relations between the government and the Episcopate depended 
on the interests of both sides. The Church authorities were mainly interested 
in regulating the legal status of the Church and in normalizing diplomatic 
relations between the Polish People’s Republic and Vatican City. The 
government, in the face of the economic crisis and possible social unrest, was 
expecting the Episcopate to support the negotiations with the “Solidarity” 
opposition.  
 Of course, the political line of the Primate Glemp, which was based on 
making compromises with the communists, was not approved of by all 
members of the Church as there were internal tensions within the Episcopate 
caused by the various attitudes towards the communist regime. Complaisance 
towards the ruling party, represented by the cardinal Jozef Glemp and his 
supporters, was defied by the bishop Ignacy Toakrczuk and the cardinal 
Henryk Gulbinowicz and many others (Kindziuk, 2010, 201, 225). 
 The deteriorating economic situation in Poland as well as the 
radicalization of the society, which wanted to free itself from the restraints of 
the totalitarian system, indicated the imminent fall of communism. The 
attempts to overcome the crisis in Poland did not have a chance to succeed as 
they mainly consisted in the prices of goods going up which hit the 
impoverished society. In the face of the risk of the further social unrest, the 
Episcopate started to protest against the price increase and the unsuccessful 
reforms. At the same time, they started to negotiate with the government. The 
representatives of the discredited and bankrupt system made use of the 
conciliatory activities of the Episcopate engaged in a dangerous game, i.e. 
behind-closed-doors deals between the communist regime and a part of the 
“Solidarity” opposition which ended with the contract of “the round table”. To 
meet the expectations of the communist regime, the bishops urged the nation 
for Christian forgiveness and reconciliation, which calmed down the society. 
Better relations between the victim and the former oppressor released social 
tensions and ended the conflict situation. Wojciech Jaruzelski held an official 
meeting with the leader of the Conference of the Polish Episcopate, the 
cardinal Glemp, which was skilfully used by the government media to create, 
so called, social dialogue. Jadwiga Staniszkis thinks that, by playing an artful 
game with the society as well as with the opposition and the Church, the 
communists wanted to buy time as they feared that “if the external empire 
goes down too quickly (before the guarantee of safety is achieved in the 
negotiations with the opposition),  the “burning of the committees” will 
happen. (Staniszkis, 2009, 184). 
 The growing economic crisis, the loss of the social support for the 
ruling party and well as the risk of the outbreak of social unrest led the 
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representatives of the Episcopate to undertake the mediation activities. In 
1988, they actively participated in the negotiations aimed at reaching the 
agreement between the government and the opposition. The mutual 
arrangements were related to laying down the conditions for dismantling the 
totalitarian system and for the society and the state to enter the path of the 
political transformations. To express the support for the national agreement 
the clergymen participated in the unofficial meetings in Magdalenka and the 
official meetings at “the round table” (Informacja Biura Prasowego, 1996, 
585). The representatives of the Episcopate engaged in setting out the 
conditions of the agreement which, according to them, took into consideration 
the common good of the society. According to the Episcopate, the compromise 
reached at “the round table” should guarantee the employment rights, 
especially the rights for labourers and farmers to join unions according to 
their own choice (Komunikat 230 Konferencji, 2006, 337). The aim was to lay 
the foundation for the substantial reforms of the state structure and the national 
economy. Moreover, the bishops expected that the dialogue between the 
communist authorities and the representatives of the opposition would 
stimulate the process of the consolidation of the society and strengthen the 
position of Poland on an international level (Komunikat 230 Konferencji, 
2006, 337). 
 The authorities were satisfied with the active participation of the 
representatives of the Episcopate in the process of reaching the agreement with 
a part of the opposition. During the session of the Joint Commission of the 
representatives of the government and the Episcopate (23rd January 1989), 
Stanislaw Ciosek, the prominent member of the Central Committee of the 
Polish United Workers’ Party, pointed out to the important role of the Church 
in the process of the development of  the reformatory initiatives by the ruling 
party in the 80s: After 13th December 1981, the relations between the 
government and the Church built the foundation for the transformations of 
both - the worldview as well as the political life. We are not talking here about 
<the black and red ally> or <the throne and aspergillum ally>, as some 
people say. […] The relations between the government and the Church 
depended on the attitudes prevailing in Poland. We improved them in the 
shadow of <Solidarity> and Walesa. […] This is not only the ally between the 
state and the Church. It also develops better understanding on the most 
important level, i.e. worldview level. We are not luring the leaders of the 
Church into the trap. We discussed it in Klarysewo and then I spoke to the 
priest Orszulik and ed. Mazowiecki. We came to the conclusion that without 
the standpoint of the Church it would take us longer to formulate the 
standpoint of X plenum. This was our motivation. We don’t treat the Church 
as the guarantor but its attitude is encouraging (Dokument nr 40, 1993, 559).
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 The official enunciation of the Episcopate confirmed that not only did 
the hierarchs approve of the  arrangements between the authorities with a part 
of the opposition, but also that it was their warrantor. From the announcement 
of the Conference of the Polish Episcopate (2nd May 1989) it is evident that 
“the round table” was regarded by the bishops as the success and as an 
important and promising step towards the democratization of social life. One 
of the results achieved at “the round table” was the legalization of the trade 
union ”Solidarity”. According to the bishops, the agreement marked the 
beginning of the transformation of social, political, economic and moral life 
of the entire society. Moreover, it launched the process aimed at forming a 
national life according to the rights of the sovereign society and it created a 
new chance for the country (Komunikat 234 Konferencji, 2006, 342-343).  
 Despite the fact that, in the official documents, the Episcopate referred 
to the arrangements of “the round table” in a positive way, there were internal 
tensions within the Episcopate and differences in the way hierarchs evaluated 
the event. For the cardinal Jozef Glemp ”the round table” was a considerable 
success of the Church diplomacy. The Primate thought that it was unfounded 
to doubt and question the good intentions of the sides reaching the agreement. 
According to Glemp, the accusation that “the round table” was a deal with the 
communists or even the betrayal of the national interest was false: Neither the 
deal with the communists nor the betrayal took place. These accusations are 
false. We did our best to make the change of the system happen without 
bloodshed. That is why, the Church sent its representatives to take part in the 
talks. At that point, I was already convinced that the end of communism was 
coming, that the system was breaking down. I considered “the round table” 
as an important step forward. It was difficult not to engage in those 
transformations. The Church has never abandoned the nation and it has 
always felt responsible for it (as cities in Kindziuk, 2010, 288). The positive 
results of the agreement were also highlighted by the secretary of the 
Conference of the Polish Episcopate, the archbishop Bronislaw Dabrowski, 
who represented the Church in many negotiations. According to Dabrowski, 
the agreement between the communists and the opposition was the success of 
the entire society: The Church in Poland is very satisfied with the situation. It 
has always cared for, aimed at and supported the conciliatory tendencies 
which would lead to the national reconciliation. Therefore, it was present at 
<the round table> as the observer – the witness (Dabrowski, 1995, 467). 
 The bishop of Przemysl, Ignacy Tokarczuk, had a different opinion on 
the social and political consequences of “the round table”. He thought that, in 
1989, there was a chance for the substantial  transformation of the country, but 
“the round table” ruined it because it gave the impression that democratically 
everything was taken care of. Meanwhile, it had been planned beforehand (Nie 
mozna zdradzic, 2012, 125). According to Tokarczuk, the mystification of ”the 
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round table” made it difficult to know ”who is who” because various groups 
were looking for a certain way to win the situation, to hold onto power over 
the same people, even from behind the scenes (Nie mozna zdradzic, 2012, 
125). Similar conviction was expressed by the bishop Kazimierz Majdanski. 
He thought that the contract signed at “the round table” made it impossible to 
take unambiguous actions and to judge the illegal activities of the communist 
authorities and subordinate security services: In 1989 the decision was made 
to forget and to absolve the past. Was it that successful so that the past was 
put behind? Because if it had, and the compensation had been granted, it 
would have been a great triumph of forgiveness. If it hadn’t happened, the 
forgiveness was neither human nor Christian. On the contrary, we would have 
found ourselves in the situation of the common falsification. […] The faults, 
which nobody regretted, were forgotten and the great injustice, which nobody 
corrected, was forgiven. (as cited in Jackowski, 1997, 40).    
 Critical opinions were also expressed about the representatives of the 
Episcopate who were engaged in the moderation of the agreement between the 
communist regime and a part of the opposition. The activities undertaken by 
the priest Alojzy Orszulik met with particularly strong disapproval. Some of 
his negotiating activities were strongly criticized by the Primate Glemp. In his 
opinion, Orszulik was boasting himself about being the main constructor of 
the Church policy at “the round table” and launching the initiatives which 
were treated as the activities undertaken in the name of the Episcopate, but 
which very often were contradictory to its political line (Rakowski, 2005, 
408). It might have been possible that his behaviour during negotiations was 
influenced by his activities behind closed doors, especially by the fact that he 
was registered in the category of “the Informal Collaborator andidate” and  
“the operational contact of the Security Service (Aparat represji 
wobec…2009, 99-100; Cenckiewicz, Chmielecki, Kowalski, Piekarska, 2013, 
353).  
 The negative opinion about Orszulik being engaged in the deals 
between the authorities and a part of ”Solidarity” was also expressed by Peter 
Raina. According to Raina, one of the biggest mistakes of the ecclesiastical 
moderators taking part in the negotiations turned out to be the approval of the 
list of the participants of “the round table” prepared by Lech Walesa. Among 
50 people suggested by the leader of the opposition there were the “Solidarity” 
activists and its supporters. However, the vast majority of them were people 
with left-wing social and political views. The list also included a few liberals. 
The list did not, however, include those who were fighting for independence 
and the law and order in Poland, whose who were imprisoned, tortured and 
discriminated by the communist system (Raina, 1999, 329, 332; Rakowski, 
2005, 510). 
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 According to Raina, Alojzy Orszulik bore the responsibility for this 
situation. Given the mandate of trust from the Church and the nation, not only 
did he try to convince everyone about the necessity to establish “the round 
table” but he also actively participated in the preparation of the session. 
Therefore, Raina thinks that the moral obligation of Orszulik, as the 
representative of the Church and the nation, was to convince Lech Walesa to 
invite people engaged in the independence movement to take part in the 
negotiations. Raina is of the opinion that the balance of forces among the 
representatives of the opposition turned out to be very unfavourable for the 
nationalists, as there weren’t many true representatives of the nation (Raina, 
1999, 236). At the “round table”, on one hand, we could find the 
representatives of the communist authorities and, on the other hand, the 
representatives of <Solidarity> and doctrinaires of the left-wing and liberal 
ideology (Raina, 1999, 236). Also, Witold Kiezun thinks that the agreement 
made at “the round table” shared the power between the communist and the 
left-wing Solidarity opposition (Kiezun, 2012, p. 30). 
 The public opinion was of significant importance in the evaluation of 
the participation of the representatives of the Episcope in the deals between 
the communist and a part of the opposition. The results of the sociological 
research show that the Catholic Church was clearly losing the social trust at 
the beginning of the 90s. The vast majority of the society was disappointed 
with the socio-political situation in Poland, including the role of the 
Episcopate in the process of the transformation of the system. Poles suffered 
the consequences of, so called, economic reforms (Feliksiak, 2010, 5). The 
social dissatisfaction with the situation in Poland influenced the evaluation of 
the Church hierarchy whose representatives took part in dismantling the 
communist system and were perceived by the citizens as the warrantor of the 
interests of the society. Trust towards the institutionalized Church, which in 
autumn 1989 reached the level of 88%, dropped down to 38% in spring 1993. 
This indicates a dramatic decrease of social support (a drop by 50%) for the 
institution which, unquestionably, contributed to the abolishment of 
communism. The decrease was not, however, reflected in the religious 
practices of Poles (Opinions on institutions and organizations..., 1993, 7; 
Marczuk, 1993, 116-117; Załęcki, 2001, 59-60). 
 It is difficult not to agree with Ryszard Gryz who thinks that the 
Church lost the social trust as the price for being the peace warrantor (from 
April 1989) during the implementation of the arrangements made at “the round 
table”: Being the warrantor of the contract of the Round Table, the Church 
took shared responsibility for the consequences, out of which only some were 
positively perceived. Peace between the repentant oppressor and the generous 
victim was consistent with the Christian system of values. However, the 
question is whether the repentance of the oppressor was real and sufficient 
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(Dudek, Gryz, 2006, 441). This train of thought is supported by the 
sociologist, the priest Wladyslaw Piwowarski: “So called <round table> has 
had a negative impact on the situation of today’s Poland. Against the will of 
the majority of Poles, <the power> (politics) and <the money> (economy) 
were in hands of various oligarchic powers which took control over our 
country. This mainly includes the former communists who became socio-
democrats and the political and economic advisors of <Solidarity>, i.e. 
cosmopolitans and liberals. Neither of them were devoted to creating common 
good of the nation (the society), which should be the aim of the state. It 
retrospect, it becomes clear and obvious. The only thing that they had to 
achieve was the legalization of power” (as citied in Zieliński, 2003, 374).    
 
Summary 
 In the 80s, the dynamic transformation of the relations between the 
Episcopate and the communist regime took place. These changes led the 
representatives of the Episcopate to enter the political deals whose signatories 
were: the government and a part of the Solidarity opposition. In the opinion of 
the society, the presence of the Church representatives at “the round table “ 
was to guarantee the national interests and the Polish reason of state. It turned 
out, however, that the contract signed at “the round table” secured mainly the 
interests of the party and gave the guarantee to its officers that they would not 
be judged for their illegal activities towards the Polish society, especially 
towards people engaged in the oppositional activities. The participation of the 
Church in dismantling the communist system was perceived negatively by a 
part of the society as it authenticated the deals which made it possible for the 
transition from communism to post-communism to happen slowly. A part of 
the society was convinced that the representatives of the Episcopate, by 
playing a skilful game with the communists and the opposition in the 80s, 
acted in the interest of the institution they represented. For the Episcopate the 
priority was to secure the interests of the Church, including the regulation of 
its legal status of in Poland.   
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